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F r o m  T h e  E d i t o r
Part One of a two-part article on Authentication, Authorization, and 
Accounting (AAA) was published in our previous issue. This time 
Sean Convery presents Part Two—subtitled “Protocols, Applications, 
and the Future of AAA.”
Interest in IP Version 6 (IPv6) is growing in many parts of the Internet 
technical community; see, for example, the announcement from ARIN 
on page 39 of this issue. Transition to IPv6 is likely to be one of the 
greatest technical challenges in the history of the Internet. Several 
groups are developing parts of the overall solution by creating IPv6-
capable versions of protocols such as the Dynamic Host Confi guration 
Protocol (DHCP) or including support for IPv6 in the Domain 
Name System (DNS). Although not yet widely deployed, IP Network 
Mobility is expected to play an important part in the Internet of the 
future. For this reason the IETF is working on IP mobility with an 
eye toward IPv6. Our second article looks at the Network Mobility 
(NEMO) Basic Support Protocol, which is being developed by the 
NEMO working group in the IETF.
Depletion of IPv4 address space is not the only concern for network 
operators and developers these days. Questions about the long-term 
viability of today’s routing protocols and the associated addressing 
systems center around a basic concern about how we can scale our 
networks to a size orders of magnitude larger than what we have 
today. A recently formed Routing and Addressing Problem Directorate 
(ROAP) is tasked to examine these problems in detail. Several ROAP-
related sessions took place during the most recent IETF meeting, and 
Geoff Huston reports on these sessions and gives his analysis and 
commentary. Incidentally, Geoff was not present in person at this 
IETF meeting, but the facilities to follow an IETF meeting remotely 
are now of such a quality that he was able to participate from the 
other side of the world.
Protocol replacement or enhancement is also the theme in our fi nal 
article. Dave Crocker asks the question “Is it time to replace SMTP?” 
Since this is an opinion piece, we invite your feedback or rebuttals.
New on our Website is a linked article index. Visit cisco.com/ipj 
and click on “Index Files” to explore this feature.
—Ole J. Jacobsen, Editor and Publisher
ole@cisco.com
You can download IPJ
back issues and fi nd
subscription information at:
www.cisco.com/ipj
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Network Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting
Part Two: Protocols, Applications, and the Future of AAA
by Sean Convery, Identity Engines
N etwork Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting has been used since before the days of the Internet as we know it today. Authentication asks the question, “Who or what are 
you?” Authorization asks, “What are you allowed to do?” And fi nally, 
accounting wants to know, “What did you do?” These fundamental 
security building blocks are being used in expanded ways today. The 
fi rst part of this two-part series focused on the overall concepts of 
AAA, the elements involved in AAA communications, and high-
level approaches to achieving specifi c AAA goals. It was published in 
IPJ Volume 10, No. 1[0]. This second part of the series discusses the 
protocols involved, specifi c applications of AAA, and considerations 
for the future of AAA.
AAA Protocols
Although AAA is often thought of as the exclusive province of the 
Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) protocol, 
in reality a range of protocols is involved at various stages of the 
AAA conversation. This section introduces these AAA protocols, 
organized according to the parties involved in the communication. 
We divide AAA communications into the following categories: Client 
to Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), PEP to Policy Decision Point 
(PDP), Client to PDP, and PDP to Policy Information Point (PIP). For 
easy reference, the AAA fl ow diagram from Part One of this article is 
reproduced here. Please refer to Part One[0] for the explanatory text 
associated with the diagram.
Figure 1: A Client Connects to a
AAA-Protected Network 
(from Part One)
PEP
PIP
PIP
PIP
PDP
7
3
4
5
2
6
9
1
8
PEP
PEP
Production Network
Acct.
Client
The Internet Protocol Journal
3
Client to PEP 
AAA communications between the client and the PEP can travel at 
Layer 2 of the OSI model, or they can run at higher layers, relying 
on lower layers as essentially dumb transport. The most common 
protocols for client-to-PEP communication are the Point-to-Point 
Protocol (PPP)[1], PPP over Ethernet (PPPoE)[2], IEEE 802.1X[3], IP 
Security (IPsec), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) VPN, and Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), each of which is discussed in this article.
PPP, the standard protocol for communicating across point-to-point 
links, includes an option al authentication step—the point at which 
the AAA element is introduced. During this authentication phase, 
protocols such as the Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol 
(CHAP) can be used to identify the client to the PEP. (These protocols 
were discussed in the credential section of Part One of this article.) 
PPP is extensively used in dialup access but is otherwise not found in 
modern AAA. PPPoE, an adaptation of PPP to run over Ethernet, is 
used by many service providers rolling out broadband services. 
PPPoE allows the broadband endpoint to authenticate itself to the 
service provider’s network when making the initial connection. 
Because many broadband networks use shared Ethernet mediums, 
PPPoE allows Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to maintain the per-
user accounting they were familiar with from dialup. The 802.1X 
protocol is an IEEE standard specifying a way to provide network 
access control at the port level for wired and wireless networks. The 
802.1X standard specifi es a way for the client to communicate with 
the PDP using the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)[4], which 
is discussed in more detail later in this section. The 802.1X standard 
requires that the endpoint support 802.1X through a “supplicant” 
or client sign-on application. This application authenticates the client 
to the network through the PEP. (See the EAP section later in this 
article for an explanation showing how EAP and 802.1X can work 
together.)
For wireless networks, 802.1X has become the standard way of 
authenticating clients because it supports communicating unique key 
material to the client to secure its use of the wireless infrastructure. 
In wired Ethernet networks, 802.1X is rising in popularity as a way 
to authenticate clients as well. These applications are more fully 
described in the “AAA Applications” section, later in this article.
At a more generic level, the IPsec protocol has established a standard 
for securing IP communic ations, and this approach has become 
another common method of communicating from a client to a PEP 
(referred to as a VPN Gateway from an IPsec perspective). The 
initial authentication for IPsec communications uses the Internet 
Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. Version 1[5] of the IKE protocol had 
no built-in method for authenticating users with credentials such as 
passwords, so an extension to IKE called XAUTH[6] was proposed. 
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XAUTH never became an offi cial standard (though it certainly was 
a de facto one) because the IETF IPsec working group created 
a second version of IKE[7] that used EAP as a transport for cre-
dentials such as passwords. Finally, in the areas of HTTP and VPN 
communications, the SSL and Transport Layer Security (TLS)[28] 
standards are two closely related protocols for securing, among other 
things, Web com munications. SSL/TLS VPNs use these protocols to 
create a secure session from the client to the PEP (VPN Gateway). 
Client authentication with SSL and TLS can be done with client-side 
certifi cates, but more commonly they use passwords or One-Time 
Passwords (OTPs).
PEP to PDP 
The three main protocols for communicating between a PEP and 
a PDP are TACACS+[9], RADIUS, and Diameter[10]. First, consider 
TACACS+: Developed by Cisco, TACACS+ is a proprietary protocol 
that is used primarily in communicating administ rator authorizations 
for network devices. TACACS+ uses TCP port 49 and features payload 
encryption for the entire TACACS+ message. Though developed by 
Cisco, TACACS+ is supported by other companies as well, including 
Juniper.
Although TACACS+ excels at command-level authorizations and 
accounting for administrator control, another protocol has become 
far more common for client AAA: RADIUS. Thanks to nearly 
ubiquitous support for this protocol in network hardware, RADIUS 
is the primary protocol for communication between a PEP and a PDP 
in most environments. RADIUS uses the User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) port 1812 for authentication and authorization and UDP port 
1813 for accounting[8] (early deployments used ports 1645 and 1646, 
which are still used some times today). RADIUS supports numerous 
different attributes for communicating information back and forth 
from the PEP to the PDP, such as client MAC address, username, 
fi lter information for enforcement, and so on. It also supports an 
extensible framework for Vendor-Specifi c Attributes (VSAs), which 
allow extensions of the functions of RADIUS to support whatever 
elements a given PEP might need to best serve its role on the network. 
For example, a PEP manufacturer might support VSAs that allow the 
assignment of a user to a particular enforcement profi le. RADIUS 
in its default implementation encrypts only the Pass word fi eld of 
RADIUS messages, making the RADIUS protocol more prone to 
leaking information that could be used by an adversary. Both RADIUS 
and TACACS+ are secured by only a shared secret that is confi gured 
on both the PEP and the PDP. 
Finally, consider the Diameter protocol. Diameter (the name is a play 
on words from RADIUS) is the next-generation, de jure standard 
for AAA. It supports stronger security through either IPsec or TLS 
and greater extensibility than RADIUS. It uses port 3868 for either 
TCP or the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)[11]. The 
strongest use of Diameter to date is in the carrier space, where it 
provides AAA for call processing and third-generation (3G) mobile 
networks. 
AAA—Part Two:  continued
The Internet Protocol Journal
5
However, the corporate market has been fairly reluctant to embrace 
Diameter, and that reluctance has translated into a lack of support 
for Diameter in corporate network infrastructure equipment. 
At this point in the discussion, it makes sense to compare RADIUS 
and Diameter. Although Diameter is an obvious alternative, RADIUS 
continues to be used in both new and existing deployments, so the 
IETF has a working group specifi cally formed to extend RADIUS 
in the future. The relationship between RADIUS and Diameter is a 
little like the relationship between IPv4 and IPv6. IPv6 had IPsec as 
a standard feature, IPv4 integrated IPsec as well, and today, by a 
large margin, most IPsec deployments are on IPv4 networks. The 
situation is similar with AAA. RADIUS certainly had limitations, but 
since Diameter entered the picture, RADIUS has been extended to 
address some of those shortcomings, particularly with both protocols 
using EAP as a transport. The result is that RADIUS today does what 
most people want. Therefore, given the signifi cant added complexity 
of Diameter, many organizations have elected not to migrate to 
Diameter. Both RADIUS and Diameter will be around for many years 
to come.
Client to PDP 
Although most of the protocols in this article handle communication 
from one component to the next component in the AAA chain (that 
is, client to PEP, PEP to PDP, etc.), there is one protocol that deals with 
communication from the client to the PDP directly: the Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP). As mentioned earlier, EAP is a fl exible 
mechanism for com municating almost any kind of credential over 
almost any lower-layer transport. Each technique for authenticating 
a client is referred to as an EAP Method. Originally conceived as an 
extension to PPP, EAP can now use many transports, including IKEv2 
and 802.1X. Cisco’s proprietary Network Admission Control (NAC) 
solution offers a deployment option that puts EAP inside UDP. When 
using 802.1X, for example, EAP uses LAN transport, referred to as 
EAPoL (EAP over LAN). This transport is only for the connection 
between the client and the PEP though. From the PEP to the PDP, 
EAP rides inside RADI US[12, 13]. The actual conversation, however, 
takes place between the client and the PDP, with the PEP acting as a 
relay.
The major benefi t of this approach is that the PEP does not need to 
understand the specifi cs of the EAP method selected—only the client 
and the PDP do. The EAP specifi cation in the IETF specifi es several 
different EAP methods, including EAP Message Digest Algorithm 
5 (EAP-MD5, very similar in security to CHAP), EAP-OTP (which 
supports an IETF-defi ned OTP solution[14]), and EAP Generic Token 
Card (EAP-GTC). Of the methods explicitly called out in the EAP 
standard, EAP-GTC is the only one in much use today in production 
networks. EAP-GTC allows the use of OTP token cards within an 
EAP context. 
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Beyond the methods defi ned in the EAP standard, EAP by its nature 
can be extended to support additional methods. EAP Subscriber 
Identity Module (EAP-SIM)[15] specifi es a method for authentication 
using SIM elements in the Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM). EAP-SIM was developed by the Third Generation Partnership 
Project (3GPP) as a solution for these second-generation (GSM) mobile 
networks. EAP-AKA[16] is the 3GPP’s EAP authentication technique 
for third-generation (Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service 
[UMTS] or Code Division Multiple Access 2000 [CDMA2000]) mobile 
networks. Both EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA support authenticating a 
mobile phone to a Wi-Fi network without using passwords. The 
problem is that without some sort of user identity federation solution 
in place, SIM-based authentication can work only with the mobile 
provider’s network that supplied the SIM card. EAP-TLS[17] specifi es 
a technique for mutual certifi cate authentication. Although it is 
widely supported, EAP-TLS is not commonly deployed because of its 
requirement for client-side certifi c ates.
Though none of the following EAP methods are standards, 
they—somewhat confusingly—represent the vast majority of EAP 
deployments. Each of them is referred to as a Tunneled EAP Method 
because it establishes one outer EAP method as a base secure channel 
and then runs another method (one that may be less secure) over 
that secure channel. Protected EAP (PEAP)[18], well supported 
in Microsoft’s Windows operating system, has become a de facto 
standard for EAP methods. Most clients and PDPs support PEAP 
today. PEAP works by establishing a TLS session authenticated by 
the server certifi cate, and then an inner authentication method rides 
inside that TLS session. The inner method is almost always Microsoft 
CHAP Version 2 (MS-CHAPv2), but other methods can be used 
as well. Another popular tunneled protocol is EAP Tunneled TLS 
(EAP-TTLS)[19]. This protocol is similar to PEAP except it supports 
a more arbitrary exchange of information inside the TLS tunnel. 
For example, one of the primary uses for EAP-TTLS is using the 
Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) as the inner authentication 
method, allowing an EAP-TTLS-capable PDP to authenticate clients 
against older password stores (such as those that support only PAP 
authentication).
Finally, in settings that use primarily Cisco equipment, a common 
tunneled protocol is EAP Flexible Authentication via Secure 
Tunneling (EAP-FAST)[20]. This protocol uses TLS to authenticate the 
PDP, and then a shared key is distributed to allow faster subsequent 
authentication. An inner EAP method such as MS-CHAPv2 can then 
be used to authenticate the client to the server. EAP-FAST is used 
extensively in Cisco products for wireless deployments.
AAA—Part Two:  continued
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PDP to PIP 
The fi nal set of AAA protocols we consider are the ones that govern 
the communication between the PDP and the PIP. The primary 
protocol of interest is the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
(LDAP)[21]. From a AAA context, LDAP allows a PDP to query a 
PIP (typically an X.500 directory[22]) for information about a client. 
This information is exposed through a series of group and attribute 
identifi ers, which can include information about a client’s home 
location, organizational role, job title (if referring to a user), and so 
on. LDAP includes several different authentication options[23]. This 
client information learned from the PIP enables the PDP to better 
make its policy decision. Also useful in the PDP-PIP communications 
context is the RADIUS protocol. Some large organizations or inter-
organization federations use a hierarchy of RADIUS-speaking PDPs 
where one RADIUS PDP can act as a PIP for another RADIUS PDP 
further down the AAA hierarchy. 
Finally, Microsoft Active Directory (AD) uses the LDAP proto-
col when acting as a PDP but also has its own extension, called 
Netlogon, for validating Microsoft credentials such as MS-CHAPv2. 
This means that integrating a PDP with Microsoft AD generally 
involves using LDAP to fi nd information about the client and using 
Netlogon to validate the client’s credential. Other options for PDP-to-
PIP interaction—though less often used—include Structured Query 
Language (SQL) databases, Network Information Service (NIS), and 
Kerberos.
AAA Applications
This section surveys the different applications of AAA technology 
throughout networking. It is divided into three sections covering 
consumer, enterprise, and carrier applications, with a fi nal section 
covering emerging applications of AAA technology.
Consumer-Managed Applications 
Most consumer network deployments do not perform any advanced 
AAA beyond a shared key for authentication to a wireless network. 
In this example, the client is the consumer’s host and the wireless 
access point acts as PEP, PDP, and PIP by validating that any client 
connecting to the access point presents the correct shared key.
Enterprise-Managed Applications 
AAA has numerous enterprise applications, including remote access, 
wireless security, Voice over IP (VoIP), guest access, Role-Based 
Access Control (RBAC), and endpoint posture validation (also 
known as NAC). This section discusses each of these applications. 
Remote-access security is the original enterprise AAA application. 
In the remote-access scenario, remote users connect over a dialup 
connection or a VPN and authenticate themselves (and optionally 
their hosts) to the organization’s network. 
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The client’s credential is almost always a password, expressed in one 
of the forms discussed in the credential section of Part One of this 
article. The main purpose of AAA in the remote-access case is to 
validate that the client is a valid user of the organization’s network. 
Wireless security is similar in some respects to remote-access security. 
The goals of AAA in wireless security are twofold: fi rst it must validate 
that the wireless client is an authorized user, and second, it must 
provide the client with a session key for cryptographic protection of 
the client’s traffi c. Given these goals, 802.1X using EAP are the ideal 
protocols to use because they support both client authentication and 
dynamic keying. Older wireless security approaches relied on an open 
wireless network and a VPN Gateway separating that network from 
the rest of the organization’s network. In that example, the wireless-
security approach mimics the remote-access application just discussed. 
Other types of networking require different applications of AAA. 
For example, VoIP deployments have authentication requirements as 
well. The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)[24] is used extensively for, 
well, session initiation in VoIP networks (for example, authenticating 
the calling parties prior to initiating a new call). Authentication can 
be handled natively within SIP using HTTP digest authentication, or 
the same request can be sent to a PDP using RADIUS. AAA for VoIP 
allows handsets to authenticate themselves to the network and gain 
access to call-processing services.
Another, very popular application of AAA is guest-access management 
for networks. This application has grown quickly with the recent 
growth of wireless networks. Guest access is a method by which 
guests can be granted temporary access to a network with a full 
audit trail[27]. Guest access generally involves creating a distinct PIP, 
which houses short-term user accounts, and a technique for creating 
and, after a confi gurable period of time, automatically deactivating 
those user accounts. The PIP is often co-resident with the PDP and 
allows this temporary access without having to provision these users 
into the organization’s more permanent directory. The guest can 
communicate with the PEP using any of the client-PEP protocols 
discussed earlier, though HTTP is the most common. The PEP is told 
by the PDP that the client (because it is a guest) should have restricted 
access—typically access only to the Internet at large and not any 
communication with an organization’s internal network.
Also growing in popularity as a AAA application is RBAC, an 
application of AAA that allows customization of the network session 
based on the role of the client. In fact, guest access is a simple form 
of RBAC whereby two classes of clients are created: guest and 
permanent. However, RBAC can be extended to include more levels 
of delineation, including guest, contractor, and specifi c classes of 
permanent users such as sales, human resources, and engin eering. 
AAA—Part Two:  continued
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This classifi cation can be done with all forms of AAA-enabled 
network infrastructure, including wired, wireless, and remote access. 
Current scalability limitations of VLAN technology and Access 
Control Lists (ACLs) make creating large quantities of roles diffi cult, 
but a signifi cant business benefi t in audit and regulatory compliance 
can be realized with usually fewer than fi ve roles. 
To implement RBAC, most organizations choose a mix of 802.1X 
and HTTP authentication for wired and wireless access, combined 
with VPN technology for remote access. This approach is the most 
common one to RBAC, though others are used. 
Finally, another important AAA application is Endpoint Posture 
Validation, also referred to as Network Access Control (NAC). 
Unfortunately NAC is an inappropriate name because of its almost 
complete overlap with the more general AAA term—leading to a fair 
amount of confusion in the market. Endpoint posture validation re-
fers to many different parameters in the industry as it is an emerging 
technology. These parameters range from very narrow device-centric 
posture checking to a more identity-centric approach for secure mo-
bile computing. Because this entire article is concerned with the lat-
ter, we will consider NAC in its narrow context of endpoint posture 
checking. With this label, NAC simply acts as another PIP for the 
PDP to use. 
This time, though, instead of checking the client’s credential, NAC 
checks the client’s software confi guration. This checking generally 
focuses on security-sensitive confi gur ation details of the endpoint 
security software and the operating system itself, such as the revision, 
confi guration, and current operating status. This client confi guration 
data is gathered by a host agent on the client and then sent to the 
PDP or PIP for evaluation. The host agent is either permanent on the 
client or downloaded dynamically to acquire the information. Some 
NAC applications rely exclusively on external scanning of the client, 
although this scanning generally yields far less granular information 
than an agent would.
The challenge with NAC today is deploying a system built on 
standards. The IETF and the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) are 
both pursuing standards in this space. Meanwhile Cisco, Microsoft, 
and a host of smaller companies have offerings not currently based on 
any standard. Recent announcements from the TCG and Microsoft 
are changing this. The TCG recently standardized the as-implemented 
NAC protocol used by Microsoft’s NAC approach. Though there is 
much more work to do, this should allow the beginnings of standards-
based interoperability in NAC solutions since a core protocol in 
Microsoft’s NAC is now a standard from the TCG. There is a great 
base in standards at a low enough layer in all the NAC approaches 
though, as the emerging standards use the protocols discussed in this 
article including 802.1X, IPsec, RADIUS, and LDAP.
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Carrier-Managed Applications 
Some carrier-managed AAA applications are similar to those for the 
enterprise and others are different. The common distinctions for 
almost all carrier applications are their large scale and their emphasis 
on accounting. Carrier applications include dialup, DSL or cable 
PPPoE, mobile or 3G, wireless hotspot, and metro wireless. Dialup 
is similar to the remote-access application in the enterprise section, 
but on a massive scale. Network Access Servers (NASs) for a large 
ISP are geographically dispersed, as are the PDP and PIP systems that 
support them. Clients communicate with the PEP (NAS) with PPP 
using one of the password credential techniques discussed in Part 
One of this article, and the PEP communicates with the PDP using 
RADIUS or Diameter. 
Now consider DSL or cable PPPoE. Though PPPoE-based broadband 
access seems to be on the decline, many ISPs are still using PPPoE for 
the enhanced audit trail it provides compared with an unauthenti-
cated connection. In the realm of mobile telephone networks, service 
providers are increasingly providing data services in mobile phones, 
and these services require AAA for security and billing. Such data 
services come in several varieties on both the second- and third-gen-
eration mobile networks. Additionally, smartphones are increasingly 
supporting 802.11-based wireless access as well, creating a complex 
relationship between the smartphone, mobile voice network, mobile 
data network, 802.11 data network, and VoIP-based voice services. 
Previously discussed standards such as EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA are 
trying to bridge some of these worlds, but there is much work to be 
done. Ideally, any smartphone should take advantage of the network 
with the fastest and richest set of services, and callers trying to reach 
a smartphone user as well as the user himself, should be shielded 
from this discovery and association process. Business motivators and 
detractors within the carrier space may affect this convergence. 
The next carrier-managed AAA application to discuss is the wireless 
hotspot. Hotspots work much like dialup providers in that regular 
users get a password-based credential that lets them authenticate to 
the hotspot. In this context, the 802.1X protocol is less commonly 
used because the required client software is not yet ubiquitous in the 
client install base. More common is Web-based authentication much 
like that used to access broadband in a hotel. A critical security con-
sideration for a hotspot operator is the ability to ensure that a given 
client is not connected to two hotspots at the same time—a situation 
that would indicate an account was shared between two or more 
users. This stipulation places an increasing burden on the accounting 
aspect of AAA, as with any carrier-based AAA application. 
Finally, the last AAA application we examine is the metropolitan 
wireless network, known as “metro wireless.” In metro wireless, an 
802.11 network is deployed throughout a metropolitan area, and 
access is provided free of charge or for a fee. I live in Mountain 
View, California, which is home to Google’s headquarters, and is 
where Google has installed its free, citywide metro wireless network. 
AAA—Part Two:  continued
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Although the service is free, AAA is still required: to sign on to the 
wireless net work, you must authenticate to Google using an ID. 
This step, much like signing on to a wireless hotspot, allows Google 
to trace network use to an individual (if necessary) and switch to 
a fee-based model later on if desired. HTTP authentication is most 
common in metro wireless environments, and, because of the on/off 
nature of access, little sophistication in policy decision is required 
other than validating the client’s credential.
Emerging Applications 
Several interesting applications of network AAA are emerging. The 
fi rst is in building just-in-time networks, such as when establishing 
an on-scene emergency operations center after a disaster. In this sit-
uation, emergency workers often need to communicate in a protected 
environment, and the press that covers the disaster needs network 
access to send in its reports. The AAA application required here is a 
cross between wireless security, guest access, and RBAC. 
Another emerging application is what we call “granular RBAC.” As 
opposed to RBAC, which associates users into coarse-grained classes 
of users, granular RBAC knows much more about the users and 
makes a more sophisticated access decision. 
One example of the use of granular RBAC is for classroom control 
in higher education. Increasingly, classrooms are wireless-enabled 
as a convenience feature for faculty and students. However, during 
exam time it is often useful to disable this access to the students 
taking an exam. Without a granular under standing of which clients 
are connecting to the network, this setup is very diffi cult to achieve 
without physically disabling large portions of the wireless network 
during exam time. By using AAA, a school could put class schedules 
inside an LDAP store along with the rest of the students’ information. 
Professors could also register exam times by time and location. AAA 
could then prevent students from getting on the network inside the 
classroom during their exam period, while still letting them connect 
to the network when inside their dorm room. 
Finally, the last application we consider is what I call “punitive access 
restrictions.” As net works become more and more an integral part 
of our lives, it is natural to want as fast a network connection as we 
can fi nd, creating the situation where denying access to the network 
based on past behavior (network related or not) can be used as a 
punitive action. Today, your driver’s license can be revoked based on 
your behavior while on the road. Punitive access restrictions on the 
network could mirror the same technique (for example, punishing 
people who propagate a virus by restricting their network access for 
a time) or could be used even if the infraction is not related to the 
network. Imagine a university that has trouble getting students to 
return overdue library books. Fines are one way to get the books 
back quickly, but if the student’s parents are paying the bill, this 
consequence may not be as effective as the university desires. 
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However, imagine if the student’s account record (in the PIP) had a 
directory attribute containing a count of the student’s overdue library 
books. The network could then use RBAC or Quality-of-Service 
(QoS) techniques to provide degraded access to the student until the 
books were returned.
The Future of AAA
AAA as a concept has remained relatively unchanged since its 
inception. However, as this article has demonstrated, the techniques 
and applications of AAA continue to evolve. This section discusses 
some of the ways AAA may change more fundamentally in the 
future.
Security and Identity Convergence 
Today the security and identity services provided by physical building 
access, network access, and application access are completely distinct. 
Security can be improved by communicating among these layers. 
Imagine a user executing a $10 million purchase order in a fi nancial 
application. The chance of fraud would be reduced if the application 
could know that the user was coming from an authorized client with 
an up-to-date antivirus confi guration. The chance of fraud could be 
further reduced by checking that the same user had accessed the badge 
access system of the building that day, and that the point of badge-
access entry was consistent with the location where the application 
request originated. Within computer security, the notion of defense-
in-depth has been around for a long time and is considered a best 
practice. Security and identity convergence adds new layers to this 
defense, and can potentially make all the layers more intelligent in 
their interaction.
User-Centric AAA 
In the Web application world, the notion of user-centric identity 
is gaining ground. Kim Cameron’s “Laws of Identity”[25] makes a 
compelling case that identity information housed in silos to be used 
by one organization is problematic. Several circles in the Web and e-
commerce communities are beginning to look at identity differently. 
One change, consistent with the notion of user-centric identity, is that 
users should own their own identity information and should control 
how that information is used. The simplest example I can offer is 
shopping preferences at an online store. Most online stores make 
suggestions to you based on prior purchases. This data is owned by 
the online store, though, and not you, the consumer. If you wanted 
to take your purchasing profi le from Amazon.com and transfer it to 
Barnes and Noble, it would not work. With user-centric identity, this 
kind of process is possible.
Another example is asserting a user’s age. Depending on what you 
are trying to do on the Internet, you may need to validate that you 
are above a certain age. To do that, you are often asked to enter your 
date of birth, but that is more information than the site really needs. 
AAA—Part Two:  continued
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If you could assert, with an identity you control but that is validated 
by a trusted party, that you are over the required age, it would not be 
necessary to disclose your date of birth (a process that is sometimes 
used as an authentication factor when you call places such as your 
credit card company).
The idea here is that you control your own information and limit 
what you need to share with others. This is very benefi cial for 
privacy. One user-centric identity approach is included in Windows 
Vista through an application called “Card Space.” Other approaches 
include OpenID and the Higgins Project. All of these approaches are 
somewhat consumer-focused, but if they take hold, it seems natural 
that there will be pressure for similar identity approaches in the 
enterprise and carrier space.
Federation 
One of the natural evolutions of AAA infrastructure is to start 
federating access between multiple organizations. Imagine if visiting 
professors at another university’s campus could access the network 
as guests using their password from their home location? Federation 
promises to make this possible, but the most challenging hurdles are 
political and logistical rather than technological. Protocols such as 
the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)[26] combined with 
RADIUS and LDAP can overcome this hurdle. The challenge is how 
to set up the trust relationships between the organizations to make 
it work. Eduroam based on RADIUS is an early effort delivering 
federation in Europe today.
Summary
This article, with its companion piece, has explored all aspects of 
AAA. Part One described the overall approach of AAA, how it 
works, and the elements that provide authentication, authorization, 
and accounting. Part Two has explored all the protocols used in the 
communication between the various AAA elements, the applications 
of AAA, and some thoughts about the future of AAA. AAA is 
a giant topic, and each of these sections, protocol descriptions, 
and applications could be expanded into a paper all by itself. The 
information in this article, combined with the references provided, 
should be a good starting point for your own examination of the 
specifi c aspects of AAA that are of interest to you.
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IPv6 Network Mobility
by Carlos J. Bernardos, Ignacio Soto, and María Calderón, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
T he Internet Protocol (IP) is currently accelerating the inte-gration of voice and data com munic ations. The Mobile IP protocol enables host mobility support, but several scenarios 
exist today, such as the provision of Internet access from mobile 
platforms (for example, planes, trains, cars, etc.), making it necessary 
to also support the mobility of complete net works. In response to this 
demand, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has developed 
the Network Mobility (NEMO) Basic Support Protocol[1], enabling 
IPv6 network mobility.
This article explains the Network Mobility Basic Support Protocol, by 
fi rst providing a general overview and then examining the details.
Why Network Mobility?
Accelerated by the success of cellular technologies, mobility has 
changed the way people commu nicate. As Internet access becomes 
more and more ubiquitous, demands for mobility are not restricted 
to single terminals anymore. It is also needed to support the move-
ment of a complete network that changes its point of attachment to 
the fi xed infrastructure, main taining the sessions of every device of 
the network: what is known as network mobility in IP networks. In 
this scenario, the mobile network has at least a (mobile) router that 
connects to the fi xed infrastructure, and the devices of the mobile 
network connect to the exterior through this mobile router.
Support of the roaming of networks that move as a whole is required 
in order to enable the transparent provision of Internet access in 
mobile platforms, such as the following:
• Public transportation systems: These systems would let passengers 
in trains, planes, ships, etc. access the Internet from terminals 
onboard (for example, laptops, cellular phones, Personal Digital 
Assistants [PDAs], and so on) through a mobile router located at 
the transport vehicle that connects to the fi xed infrastructure.
• Personal networks: Electronic devices carried by people, such as 
PDAs, photo cameras, etc. would connect through a cellular phone 
acting as the mobile router of the personal network.
• Vehicular scenarios: Future cars will benefi t from having Internet 
connectivity, not only to enhance safety (for example, by using 
sensors that could control multiple aspects of the vehicle oper-
ation, interacting with the environment and communicating 
with the Internet), but also to provide personal communication, 
entertainment, and Internet-based services to passengers.
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However, IP networks were not designed for mobile environments. In 
both IPv4[2] and IPv6[3, 4], IP addresses play two different roles. On the 
one hand, they are locators that specify, based on a routing system, 
how to reach the node that is using that address. The routing system 
keeps information about how to reach different sets of addresses 
that have a common network prefi x. This address aggregation in the 
routing system satisfi es scalability require ments. On the other hand, IP 
addresses are also part of the endpoint identifi ers of a com munication, 
and upper layers use the identifi ers of the peers of a communication 
to identify them. For example, the Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP), which is used to support most of the Internet applications, 
uses the IP address as part of the TCP connection identifi er.
This dual role played by IP addresses imposes some restrictions on 
mobility, because when a terminal moves from one network (IP 
subnet) to another, we would like to maintain the IP address of the 
node that moves (associated to one of its network interfaces) in order 
not to change the identifi er that upper layers are using in their ongoing 
sessions. However, we also would like to change the IP address to 
make it topologically correct in the new location of the terminal, 
allowing in this way the routing system to reach the terminal. 
Protocols such as the Dynamic Host Confi guration Protocol 
(DHCP)[5, 6] facilitated the portability of terminals by enabling 
the dynamic acquisition of IP confi guration information without 
involving manual intervention. However, this automation is not 
enough to achieve real and trans parent mobility because it requires the 
restarting of ongoing transport sessions after the point of attachment 
changes. The IETF has studied the problem of terminal mobility in IP 
networks for a long time, and IP-layer solutions exist for both IPv4 
(Mobile IPv4[7, 8]) and IPv6 (Mobile IPv6[9]) that enable the movement 
of terminals with out stopping their ongoing sessions.
If we focus on IPv6[3] networks, Mobile IPv6 does not support, as 
it is now defi ned, the movement of complete networks. One way 
of achieving the transparent mobility of all the nodes of a network 
moving together (for example, in a plane) could be enabling host 
mobil ity support in all of them, so they independently manage their 
mobility. However, this approach has the following drawbacks:
• Host mobility support (for example Mobile IP[7, 8, 9]) is required in 
all the nodes of the network. This support might not be possible, 
for example, because of the limited capa cities of the nodes (such 
as in sensors or embedded devices) or because it is not possible to 
update the software in some older devices. By having a single entity 
(the mobile router) that manages the mobility of the complete 
network, nodes of the network do not require any special mobility 
software to benefi t from the transparent mobility support provided 
by the (mobile) router.
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• The signaling exchanged because of the roaming of the network 
is limited to a single node sending only one message (avoiding 
“storms” of signaling messages every time the network moves).
• Nodes of the network must be able to attach to the access technology 
available to connect to the Internet. This requirement might mean 
that all the nodes of the network should have Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications Service (UMTS) or WiMAX inter faces, for 
example. On the other hand, by putting this require ment on a 
single node (the mobile router), nodes of the network can gain 
access to the Internet through the mobile router, using cheaper and 
widely available access tech nologies (for example, wireless LAN 
[WLAN] or Bluetooth).
Because of these problems, the IETF NEMO Working Group was 
created to standardize a solution enabling network mobility at the 
IPv6 layer. The current solution, called the Network Mobility Basic 
Support Protocol, is defi ned in RFC 3963[1].
Operation of the NEMO Basic Support Protocol
A mobile network (known also as a “network that moves,” or NEMO) 
is defi ned as a net work whose attachment point to the Internet 
varies with time. Figure 1 depicts an example of a network-mobility 
scenario. The router within the NEMO that connects to the Internet 
is called the Mobile Router (MR). It is assumed that the NEMO is 
assigned to a particular network, known as its Home Network, where 
it resides when it is not moving. Because the NEMO is part of the 
home network, the mobile network has confi gured addresses belong-
ing to one or more address blocks assigned to the home network: the 
Mobile Network Prefi xes (MNPs). These addresses remain assigned 
to the NEMO when it is away from home. Of course, these addresses 
have topological meaning only when the NEMO is at home. When 
the NEMO is away from home, packets addressed to the nodes of the 
NEMO, known as Mobile Network Nodes (MNNs), are still routed 
to the home network. Additionally, when the NEMO is away from 
home, the mobile router acquires an address from the visited network, 
called the Care-of Address (CoA), where the routing architecture can 
deliver packets without additional mechanisms.
When any node located at the Internet, known as a Correspondent 
Node (CN), exchanges IP datagrams with a Mobile Network Node 
(MNN; A in Figure 1), the following operations are involved in the 
communication:
IPv6 Network Mobility: continued
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Figure 1: Example of NEMO Basic Support Protocol Operation
CN: Correspondent Node
AR: Access Router
MR: Mobile Router
HA: Home Agent
MNN: Mobile Network Node
  Single IPv6-in-IPv6 Tunneling
  No Tunneling 
Home Network
Internet
CN
MR – HA
IPv6-in-IPv6
Bi-Directional
Tunnel
Visited Network
AR
MNNs
MR
HA
MNN A
1. The correspondent node transmits an IP datagram destined for 
MNN A. This datagram carries as its destination address the IPv6 
address of MNN A, which belongs to the MNP of the NEMO.
2. This IP datagram is routed to the home network of the NEMO, 
where it is encapsul ated inside a new IP datagram by a special 
node located on the home network of the NEMO, called the Home 
Agent (HA). The new datagram is sent to the CoA of the mobile 
router, with the IP address of the home agent as source address. 
This encapsul ation (as shown in Figure 2) preserves mobility 
transparency (that is, neither MNN A nor the correspondent node 
are aware of the mobility of the NEMO) while maintaining the 
established Internet connections of the MNN.
3. The mobile router receives the encapsulated IP datagram, removes 
the outer IPv6 header, and delivers the original datagram to 
MNN A.
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4.  In the opposite direction, the operation is analogous. The mobile 
router encapsulates the IP datagrams sent by MNN A toward its 
home agent, which then forwards the original datagram toward its 
destination (that is, the correspondent node). This encapsulation 
is required to avoid problems with ingress fi ltering, because many 
routers implement security policies that do not allow the forwarding 
of packets that have a source address that appears topologically 
incorrect.
Figure 2: Overview of NEMO Basic Support Protocol Encapsulation
Packet Encapsulation (traffic from CN to MNN)
Source IPv6
Address: CN
Destination IPv6
Address: MNN
Original IP Datagram
Payload
Source IPv6
Address: HA
Destination IPv6
Address: MR’s CoA Encapsulated IP datagram payload
Packet Encapsulation (traffic from MNN to CN)
Source IPv6
Address: MNN
Destination IPv6
Address: CN
Original IP Datagram
Payload
Source IPv6
Address: MR’s CoA
Destination IPv6
Address: HA Encapsulated IP datagram payload
Following are different types of MNNs:
• Local Fixed Node (LFN): This node has no mobility-specifi c 
software and therefore cannot change its point of attachment 
while maintaining ongoing sessions. Its IPv6 address is taken from 
a MNP of the NEMO to which it is attached.
• Local Mobile Node (LMN): This node implements the Mobile 
IPv6 protocol; its home network is located in the mobile network. 
Its home address (HoA) is taken from an MNP.
• Visiting Mobile Node (VMN): This node implements the Mobile 
IP protocol (and therefore, it can change its point of attachment 
while maintaining ongoing sessions), has its home network outside 
the mobile network, and it is visiting the mobile network. A VMN 
that is temporarily attached to a mobile subnet (used as a foreign 
link) obtains an address on that subnet (that is, its CoA is taken 
from an MNP).
IPv6 Network Mobility: continued
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Additionally, mobile networks can be nested. A mobile network is 
said to be nested when it attaches to another mobile network and 
obtains connectivity through it (refer to Figure 3). An example is a 
user who enters a vehicle with his personal area network (mobile 
network 2) and connects, through a mobile router—like a Wi-Fi 
enabled PDA—to the network of the car (mobile network 1), which 
is connected to the fi xed infrastructure.
Figure 3: Nested Mobile Network: Operation of the NEMO Basic Support Protocol (multiangular routing)
CN: Correspondent Node
AR: Access Router
MR: Mobile Router
HA: Home Agent
MNN: Mobile Network Node
  Double IPv6-in-IPv6 Tunneling
  Single IPv6-in-IPv6 Tunneling
  No Tunneling 
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Internet
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MR 2 – HA 2
IPv6-in-IPv6
Bi-Directional Tunnel
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Protocol Details: NEMO Versus Mobile IPv6
The NEMO Basic Support Protocol is an extension of the solution 
proposed for host mobility support, Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6)[9]. 
In Mobile IPv6, three mechanisms support the mobility of a host: 
movement detection, location registration, and traffi c tunneling. The 
NEMO Basic Support Protocol extends some of these mechanisms to 
support the movement of complete networks. These mechanisms are 
described next, with those parts that are different from the Mobile 
IPv6 protocol highlighted.
Movement Detection
In Mobile IPv6, the host needs to discover its own movement, so it 
can proceed with the required signaling and operations that allow 
its transparent mobility. Mobile IPv6 defi nes a generic movement-
detection mechanism based on the Neighbor Discovery Protocol[10], 
which basically consists of listening to Router Advertisements (RAs). 
Routers send these router-advertisement messages, both periodically 
and in response to a Router Solicitation message issued by a host. By 
looking at the information contained in the router advertise ments, a 
host can determine whether or not it has moved to a new link.
The NEMO Basic Support Protocol does not introduce any change 
on the movement-detection mechanisms that a mobile router can 
use.
Location Registration
When a host moves to a new network, it has to confi gure a new IPv6 
address on the visited link (belonging to the IPv6 address space of 
that visited network): the CoA, and inform the home agent of the 
movement. In Mobile IPv6, the mobile node (that is, a mobile host) 
informs its home agent of its current CoA using a mobility mes sage 
called the Binding Update (BU). This message is carried in an IPv6 
datagram using a special extension header defi ned by Mobile IPv6 to 
encapsulate all messaging related to the creation and management 
of mobility bindings, called the mobility header. The binding-update 
message contains inform ation required by the home agent to create a 
mobility binding, such as the home address of the Mobile Node (MN) 
and its CoA, where the home agent should encapsulate all the traffi c 
destined to the mobile node. The home agent replies to the mobile 
node by returning a Binding Acknowledgement (BA) message.
The NEMO Basic Support Protocol extends the binding-update 
message to convey the following additional information:
• Mobile Router Flag (R): The mobile router fl ag is set to indicate to 
the home agent that the binding update is from a mobile router. A 
mobile router can behave as a mobile host: by setting this fl ag to 0, 
the home agent does not forward packets destined for the mobile 
network to the mobile router, but forwards only those packets 
destined to the home address of the mobile router.
IPv6 Network Mobility: continued
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• Mobile Network Prefi x Option: This option is in the binding 
update to indicate the prefi x information for the mobile network 
to the home agent. There could be multiple mobile network prefi x 
options if the mobile router has more than one IPv6 prefi x in the 
mobile network and wants the home agent to forward packets for 
each of these prefi xes to the current location of the mobile router.
When the NEMO Basic Support Protocol is used to provide mobility 
to a complete network, only one binding-update or binding-ac-
knowledgement signaling messages exchange is performed, 
whereas if the Mobile IP protocol were used by all the nodes of an 
N-node network, N × (Binding-update or Binding-acknowledgement) 
signaling messages synchro nized exchanges would be required—
usually referred to as a “binding-update signaling storm.”
Mobile IPv6 defi nes a route-optimization mechanism that enables 
direct path commun ication between the mobile node and a 
correspondent node (avoiding traversal of the home agent). This 
route optimization is achieved by allowing the mobile node to send 
binding-update messages also to the correspondent nodes. In this 
way the correspondent node is also aware of the CoA, where the 
home address of the mobile node is currently reachable. A special 
mechanism—called the Return Routability (RR) procedure—is 
defi ned to prove that the mobile node has been assigned (that is, 
“owns”) both the home address and the CoA at a particular moment 
in time[11], and therefore provides the correspondent node with some 
security guarantees. 
Because of the nature of the network-mobility scenario, the task of 
providing mobile net works with route-optimization support becomes 
more complex. The IETF is currently working on this topic[12, 13, 14].
Traffi c Tunneling
In Mobile IPv6, after the mobile node has successfully registered its 
current location, the home agent starts encapsulating the data traffi c 
destined to the mobile node toward its CoA.
In a NEMO scenario, the home agent forwards not only those IP 
datagrams arriving at the home network that are destined to the 
home address of the mobile router, but also all the traffi c addressed 
to any of the mobile-network prefi xes managed by the mobile router. 
The home agent can determine which prefi xes belong to the mobile 
router in three different ways (refer to Figure 4):
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Figure 4: NEMO Basic Support Modes of Operation
Mobile Network
BU (MR’s HoA, MR’s CoA,
List of MNPs)
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Intra-domain routing protocol
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3. Intra-domain routing protocol
through bi-directional tunnel
HA
Home Network
Mobile Network
HA
Home Network
Mobile Network
HA
Home Network
MR’s HoA List of MNPs
MR
MR
MR
• Explicit mode: The mobile router includes one or more mobile 
network prefi x options in the binding-update message that it sends 
to the home agent. These options contain inform ation about the 
mobile-network prefi x(es) confi gured on the mobile network.
• Implicit mode: The mobile router does not include prefi x infor-
mation in the binding-update message it sends to the home agent. 
The home agent determines the mobile-network prefi x(es) owned 
by the mobile router by using any other mechanism (the NEMO 
Basic Support Protocol does not defi ne any, leaving this prefi x 
determination open to be implement ation-specifi c).
One example would be manual confi guration at the home agent 
mapping the home address of the mobile router to the information 
required for setting up forwarding for the mobile network.
IPv6 Network Mobility: continued
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• Intradomain Dynamic Routing Protocol through the bidirectional 
tunnel: Alternatively to the previous two modes of operation, 
the home agent and the mobile router can run an intradomain 
routing protocol (for example, Routing Information Protocol next 
generation [RIPng] or Open Shortest Path First [OSPF]) through 
the bidirectional tunnel. The mobile router can continue running 
the same routing protocol that it ran when attached to the home 
link.
Fragmentation may be needed to forward packets through the tunnel 
between the mobile router and the home agent. In this case, the 
other end of the tunnel (the home agent of the mobile router) must 
reassemble the packet before forwarding it to the fi nal destination. 
This requirement does not contradict the fact that intermediate IPv6 
routers do not fragment (as opposed to IPv4), because the mobile 
router and home agent are the actual ends of the tunnel.
Performance of the NEMO Basic Support Protocol
The NEMO Basic Support Protocol relies on the creation of a 
bidirectional tunnel between the mobile router and the home agent 
to provide transparent mobility support to a complete network. 
The use of this tunnel causes an additional overhead of 40 bytes per 
packet, because of the extra IPv6 header added by the encapsulation. 
The effect of this overhead might be relevant for applic ations that 
generate small packets, such as voice-over-IP (VoIP) packets, because 
the 40-byte added overhead may be even bigger than the actual VoIP 
payload.
The end of the bidirectional tunnel at the side of the mobile router 
needs to be updated each time the mobile network moves (and also 
periodically to refresh the binding at the home agent), to refl ect the 
current location of the mobile router. This updating is achieved by 
the binding-update or binding-acknowledgement signaling exchange 
between the mobile router and the home agent. As stated previously, 
only one exchange (two packets, one in each direction) is required per 
movement, regardless of the number of MNNs that are attached to 
the mobile router—one of the main advantages of using the NEMO 
Basic Support Protocol on the mobile router instead of Mobile IPv6 
on every node of the mobile network, because the signaling generated 
by a complete moving network (composed of numerous nodes) is the 
same as the one generated by a single moving node.
Conclusions
The NEMO Basic Support Protocol[1] extends the functions of Mobile 
IPv6 to support the mobility of complete networks. The current 
specifi cation supports basic mobility, and the IETF is currently 
working on new enhancements and extensions to provide route-
optimi zation support, multihoming capabilities, and IPv4 support.
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Some implementations of the NEMO Basic Support Protocol are 
already available. For example, the latest Cisco IOS® Software releases 
provide network mobility support. Open-source implementations 
also exist, such as the NEMO Platform for Linux (NEPL) (http://
www.mobile-ipv6.org/) and SHISA (http://www.mobileip.
jp/), for Linux and Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) operating 
systems, respectively.
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More ROAP: Routing and Addressing at IETF68
by Geoff Huston, APNIC
O ver the past year or so we have seen a heightened level of interest in Internet routing and addressing. Speculation regarding the future role of the Internet raises the possibility 
of the Internet supporting as many as hundreds of billions of 
chattering devices. What does such a future imply in terms of the 
core technologies of the Internet? Consideration of this topic has 
prompted a critical examination of the architecture of the Internet, 
including the scaling properties of routing systems, the forms of 
interdependence between addressing plans and routing, and the roles 
of addresses within the architecture. 
The March 2007 meeting of the IETF, IETF68, saw some further 
steps in analysing these topics, and many sessions addressed aspects 
of routing and addressing. This article reports on these sessions, and 
includes some conjecture as to what lies ahead.
Plenary ROAP – The Plenary Session on Routing and Addressing 
The plenary session presented an overview of the topic, looking at the 
previous initiatives in routing and addressing, as well as providing 
some perspectives on the current status of work in this area. There 
are concerns that the technology platform cannot scale by further 
orders of magnitude without some changes. Also of concern are 
the scalability of routing, the “trans parency” of the network, 
renumbering questions, provider-based addressing, and service and 
traffi c engineering and routing capabilities—and these concerns 
are potentially even more relevant and challenging for tomorrow’s 
Internet. 
Our routing technology does not localize the external effects of 
local confi guration choices. Far from being a protocol that damps 
instability, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is a highly effective 
amplifi er of noise components of routing events. So although it is a 
remarkably useful information-dissemination protocol, the properties 
of BGP in an ever-more connected world with ever-fi ner granularity 
of information raise some questions about its scaling properties. Will 
the imposed “noise” of the behaviour of the protocol completely 
swamp the underlying information content? Will we need to deploy 
disproportionately larger routers to support a larger network? The 
prospect here is that routing may become far less effi cient because 
as we simultaneously increase the degree of interconnection and the 
information load, the inability to effectively localize information 
creates a far greater load on network routing.
In addition to these observations about routing, there is the continuing 
suspicion that the semantic load of addresses in the Internet 
architecture, where an address simultaneously conveys the concepts 
of “who,” “where,” and “how,” contributes to routing load. 
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To what extent the semantic intent of endpoint identity (or “id”) 
can be separated from the semantic intent of network location and 
forwarding lookup token (or “loc”) is a question of considerable 
interest. Although the current IP address semantics removes the 
need to support an explicit mapping operation between identity and 
location, the cost lies in the inability to support an address plan that 
is cleanly aligned to network topology, and the inability to cleanly 
support functions associated with device or network mobility. In the 
end it is the routing system that carries the consequent load. The 
questions in this area include an evaluation of the extent to which 
identity can be separated from location, and the effect of such a 
measure on the operation of applications. How much of today’s 
Internet architecture would be affected by such a change, and what 
would be the resultant benefi ts if this measure were deployed? Are 
we necessarily looking at a single model of such an id/loc split, or 
should we think about this scenario in a more general manner with 
numerous potential id/loc splits?
Obviously this study of routing and addressing, and the related 
aspects of name space attributes and mapping and binding properties, 
has a very broad scope. The larger question posed here is whether we 
can defer resolution of this problem to a comfortably distant future, 
or whether its effect on the present network is imminent. Are we 
accelerating toward some form of near-term technical limit that will 
cause a signifi cant disruptive event within the deployed Internet, and 
will volume-based networks economics hold or will bigger networks 
start to experience disproportion ate cost bloat—or worse? Is it time 
to be alarmed? 
The unallocated IPv4 address pool will certainly be exhausted in the 
coming years, but this sense of alarm over routing and addressing 
is more about whether there are real limits in the near future in the 
capability to continue to route the Internet within the deployed 
platform, using the current technologies, and working within current 
cost-performance relationships irrespective of whether the addresses 
in the packet headers are 32 or 128 bits in size. There was a strong 
sense of “Don’t panic!” in the plenary presentation, with the relatively 
confi dent expectation that BGP will be able to carry the routing load 
of the Internet over the next 3 to 5 years without the need for major 
protocol “surgery,” and that Moore’s Law will continue to ensure 
that the capacity and speed of hardware will track the anticipated 
growth rates. Expectations are that the current technologies and cost-
performance parameters will continue to prevail in this time frame. 
The Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) has followed the 
Internet Architecture Board’s (IAB’s) initiative and has begun working 
with a focus group, the Routing and Addressing Problem Directorate 
(ROAP), to refi ne the broad space into many more specifi c work 
areas, and has assumed a role of coordination and communication 
across the related IETF activities. 
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In addition, because a relatively signifi cant research agenda is posed 
by such long-term questions, the Routing Research Group of the 
Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) has been rechartered and, 
judging by the participation at its most recent meeting, effectively 
reinvigorated to investigate various approaches to routing that take 
us well beyond tweaking the existing routing toolset.
Internet ROAP – The Internet Area Meeting
The Internet Area meeting concentrated on aspects of this approach 
of supporting an identifi er/locator split within the architecture of 
the Internet, and gathering some understanding as to whether this 
approach would assist with routing scaling. One of the important 
considerations in this area is working through what could be called 
boundary conditions of the study. For example, is this matter purely 
one for protocol stacks within an endpoint, or should distributed 
approaches that have active elements within the network also be 
considered? To what extent should a study consider mobility, traffi c 
engineering, Network Address Translation (NAT), and Maximum 
Transmission Unit (MTU) behaviour? What appears to be clear at 
the outset is that this network is not a “clean-slate” network, and any 
approach should be deployable on the existing infrastructure, should 
use capability negotiation to trigger behaviours so that deployment 
can be incremental and piecemeal, should allow existing applications 
and their identity referential models to operate with no changes, and, 
hopefully, should have a direct benefi t to those parties who decide to 
deploy the technology.
From the routing perspective, the overall desire is to reduce the 
growth rates of the interdomain routing space. The desired intent is 
to reduce the amount of information associated with locators so that 
locators refl ect primarily network topology in such a way that the 
locators can be effi ciently aggregated within the routing system that 
attempts to maintain a highly stable view of the network topology. 
More detailed consideration of the implications of disambiguating 
aspects of identity from those of network location involves many 
dimensions—including the structure of the spaces—the mapping 
functions, and the practicalities of any form of deployment of such 
a technology.
A critical topic appears to be how an identity-mapping function 
relates to the forwarding-mapping function. Assuming that the 
existing name spaces remain unaltered, then the resultant framework 
appears to require distinct “name-to-identifi er” and “identifi er-to-
locator” mappings and a “locator-to-forwarding” mapping. Where 
these mapping functions should be performed, who should perform 
them, when they should be performed, the duration of the validity of 
the outcomes, whether the mapping function outcomes are relative 
or universal, the scope and level of granularity in time and space 
of the map elements, the security of these mapping functions, and 
whether there is a simple operation in each mapping function or 
multiple operations all remain undefi ned at this point. 
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Other questions include whether the mapping is explicit or implicit, 
what evidence of a previous mapping operation is held in a packet 
in a visible manner, and what is occluded from further inspection 
after the mapping operation has been performed. In addition, what 
level of state is required in each host, and is there true end-to-end 
transparency—at what level? 
It is likely, at least at this stage of the study, that such a split can have 
a variety of approaches, both in the intended roles of identifi er and 
location tokens and in their binding. The expectation at this stage 
of the study is that further ideas will surface, and such ideas will be 
helpful rather than distracting. It is unclear if a single solution can 
emerge from this activity, or whether different actors have a suffi ciently 
different set of relative priorities that multiple approaches—each 
of which expresses different prioritization of functions—are viable 
longer-term outcomes.
The critical consideration here is that it is unlikely that scaling routing 
over the longer term to a much larger network is simply a matter of just 
changing the operation of the routing system itself. Real improvement 
in this area appears to also require an understanding of the meaning 
of the objects, or “addresses,” that are being passed within the routing 
system. The motivation for opening up the identifi er or locator space 
within the Internet area appears to be strongly tied to the notion 
that if you can unburden some of the roles of the addresses used in 
routing, and treat these routed tokens as unadorned network locality 
tokens, then you can gain some additional capability in routing. 
Routing ROAP – The Routing Area Meeting
The fi rst part of the Routing ROAP session looked at the trends in 
the routing system over 2005 and 2006. The overall trend appears 
to be a system that is increasingly densely interconnected, carrying 
more information elements, each of which expresses fi ner levels of 
granularity in reachability. There appears to be two forms of dynamic 
BGP load: the BGP “supernova” that burst with an intense BGP 
update load over some weeks and then disappear, and “background 
radiation” generators that appear to be unstable at a steady update 
rate for months or even the entire year.
In looking at scaling the BGP routing environment, one response is 
that of behavioural changes in local instances of BGP that reduce the 
potential for unnecessary updates to be propagated beyond a “need-
to-know-now” radius. Another response is to consider changes to 
BGP in terms of additional attributes to BGP updates—such as a 
“withdrawal-at-origin” fl ag, or selective advertise ment of “next best 
path”—both of which are intended to limit the span of advertised 
intermediate transitions while the BGP distance vector algorithm 
converges to a stable state.
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It appears that we could improve our understanding of the opera-
tional profi le of the routing space, looking particularly at the various 
forms of pathological routing behaviours and comparing these 
behaviours against the observations of known control points. Such 
a study may also lead to some more effective models of projections 
of the size of the routing space in the near- and medium-term future, 
and allow some level of quantifi cation as to what “scaling of the 
routing space” actually implies. 
The second part of the Routing ROAP session considered the current 
status of the routing world, updating some of the observations made 
at the IAB Routing Workshop and outlining some further perspectives 
on this space. One critical perspective on BGP is the behaviour of 
BGP under load. It was noted that most BGP implementations use 
adaptive responses to peer load, so that BGP attempts to ensure that 
its peer receives only the most current state information when the 
peer signals that it is not keeping pace with the update rate.
Another critical factor is the nature of “convergence” in BGP. 
The claim was made that this problem was the biggest, yet least 
important, problem with BGP. Convergence delays can be mitigated 
by Graceful Restart, Nonstop Routing, and Fast Reroute. One of the 
measures that exacerbates convergence is the use of Route Refl ectors. 
The model of information hiding or Route Refl ectors is intended to 
reduce the number of BGP peer sessions and the update load, but 
the benefi ts they do achieve are at the cost of slower convergence 
with a higher message rate during the intermediate-state transitions. 
Perhaps it is appropriate to consider small-scale changes to BGP 
behaviour to mitigate the transient BGP update bursts caused by 
path hunting, including those already mentioned of “withdrawal-at-
origin” notifi cation and propagation of backup paths. 
The approach advocated here is based on the perspective that BGP 
is not in danger of imminent collapse, and there is still considerable 
“headroom” for BGP operation in today’s Internet. 
More ROAP?
The routing space is a classic example of the commons, where each 
party can use routing to solve a multitude of business problems.
This includes, for example, using routing to perform load balancing 
of traffi c over a set of transit providers, using a “spot market” in 
Internet transit services,  creating differentiated transit offerings using 
more specifi c routes and selective advertisements. The ultimate cost 
of these local efforts in optimising local business outcomes lies in the 
increasing bloat in the routing system and the consequent escalation 
in costs across the entire network in supporting the routing system. 
There is no way to impose administrative controls on the global 
routing system, nor have we been able to devise an economic model 
of routing where the incre mental costs of local routing decisions are 
visible to the originator as true economic costs for the business, and 
the benefi t of a conservative and prudent use of the routing system 
reaps economic dividends in terms of relatively lower costs for the 
business. 
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Like the commons, there are no effective feedback mechanisms 
to impose constraint on actors in the routing space. Also, like the 
commons, there is the distinct risk that the cumulative effect of local 
actions in routing creates a situation that pushes the routing system, 
either as a whole or in various locales, into a nonfunctioning state.
Whether it needs a sense of urgency to motivate the work, or a sense 
that there can and should be a better way to plan a future than crude 
crisis management, the underlying observation is that the routing 
and address world is fundamental to tomorrow’s Internet. Unless we 
make a concerted effort to understand the various interdependencies 
and feedback systems that exist in the current environment, and 
understand the interdependences that exist between network 
behaviours and routing and addressing models, then I’m afraid that 
the true potential of the Internet will always lie within our vision—
but frustratingly just beyond our grasp.
Further Reading
Following are references to further material on this topic, as presented 
at IETF68:
• http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-iab-raws-report-01
• http://submission.apricot.net/chatter07/slides/
future_of_routing/apia-future-routing-john-scudder.
pdf
• http://submission.apricot.net/chatter07/slides/
future_of_routing/apia-future-routing-jari-arkko.pdf
• http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/07mar/slides/
plenaryw-3.pdf
• http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/07mar/agenda/
intarea.txt
• http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/07mar/agenda/
rtgarea.txt
• http://www1.tools.ietf.org/group/irtf/trac/wiki/RRG
• http://www.ietf.org/IESG/content/radir.html
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Opinion: Is It Time to Replace SMTP?
by Dave Crocker, Brandenburg InternetWorking
T he fi rst Internet (ARPANET) e-mail, sent 35 years ago, was remarkably similar to a basic text e-mail of today: From, To, CC, Subject, Date, followed by lines of text, and the familiar 
@-sign in addresses. The right side of the address changed from a 
simple string into the multilevel domain name that we now use. The 
body can now be a set of multimedia attachments rather than just 
lines of text, but it can still be in its original, simpler form. The means 
of moving mail was the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) in the early 
1970s. The current mechanism, the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
(SMTP)[1a, 1b], was not created until 10 years later, but a mere 25 years 
of use is not bad, either.
All of the technical specifi cations for e-mail have undergone many 
changes over the years, but a core requirement has been to protect the 
installed base of users and operators by incrementally adding features 
as options, rather than by performing wholesale replacement of any 
infrastructure service component. E-mail has changed the way we 
communicate, yet it is also now viewed as having a serious problem: 
As the Internet grew, it acquired the full mixture of participants, some 
of whom do not make nice neighbors. 
Frustration with the effect of abusive users is often expressed as 
a belief that the solution lies in replacing some or all of the core 
technology of the e-mail service, or even by moving to an entirely 
different paradigm, such as querying Webpages using Really Simple 
Syndication (RSS)[2]. Although different paradigms make sense for 
some forms of human communications, what is forgotten in these pleas 
for massive change is the power of the classic mail model, whether 
by paper or by electrons: Spontaneous or occasional communication 
requires the ability to “push” the message to the recipient, without 
prior arrangement. This ability is, of course, also what leaves the door 
open for abuse—anyone may walk in, uninvited and unwanted. 
The alternative proposals might work well enough for ongoing, 
regular communication among people who already know each other. 
And for most of us, that is probably 80 percent of our exchanges, or 
more. Unfortunately, as soon as anyone starts worrying about the 
remaining 20 percent, these alternative approaches require cascading 
hacks, producing a design that looks no better that what we have 
today, except that it based strictly on theory rather than decades of 
practice. It is easy for a paper proposal to beat a deployed system; 
making it work as promised is, of course, more diffi cult.
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Mantra
I have developed a simple mantra, in response to calls for replacing 
today’s Internet mail:
0. The basic problems we are experiencing with e-mail are really 
based on undesirable social behaviors, long popular outside the 
Internet. The Internet enables broader reach, to more victims, and 
in much shorter time spans, but the core misbehaviors have existed 
for all of recorded human history. We should not assume that there 
are technical solutions to social problems.
1. The beginning of changing a human service is to gain community 
consensus about the change that is needed, because a mechanism 
will not be successful unless it is perceived as needed. Only then 
can the engineers work on designing the change.
2. When there is community consensus about the way that e-mail 
needs to be changed, the folks who are currently contributing to 
its 35-year evolution need to try to fi nd a way to add the desired 
features to the existing service. Given the record of accomplishment 
of e-mail, the odds seem favorable that any new requirement can 
also be satisfi ed without disrupting the installed base.
3. When that effort fails, it will be time to create a replacement 
infrastructure.
Alas, as those who track e-mail abuse technical discussions are well 
aware, we have not completed Step 1. As soon as we try to formulate 
community consensus about basic messaging commu nication policies, 
discussion devolves into cacophony or marginalized community 
fragments. It is certain that there will eventually be a change required 
for e-mail, which we cannot fi t into the current service, but we do 
not yet have any evidence that e-mail abuse is going to produce that 
requirement.
Trust Models
One hopeful sign is that we do have a solid set of efforts to evolve e-
mail to support mechanisms that are based on trust. This evolution 
begins with the ability to associate a validated identity to a message 
and then requires assessing the “safety” of that identity’s owner. Until 
recently, only the IP address of the last-hop sending SMTP server 
could be used as an identifi er. Using addresses as identifi ers sounds 
reasonable at fi rst glance, but turns out to have long-term scaling 
and administrative problems. As a result, there has been a broad 
effort to fi nd ways to use domain names, which are more stable, and 
they align better with organizational boundaries. This process is well 
under way, with the recent IETF standardization of the Domain Keys 
Identifi ed Mail (DKIM)[3] message-signing specifi cation, as well as 
path-based registration schemes, such as Sender-ID[4] and SPF[5]. 
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That took about 5 years. And now comes the hard part: developing 
a range of assessment mechanisms—sometimes generically called 
reputation services—that satisfy requirements for quality, strength, 
convenience, and stability. Assessment services tell recipients whether 
the author of the message, or the service that sent it, can be trusted. 
Some mechanisms need to work for small groups, others need to 
work for mass-market business-to-consumer mailings, and others 
need to work among business partners. A few startup companies 
have recently joined the few, surviving volunteer services, to satisfy 
this need. It is too early to tell whether they will suffi ce, or whether 
additional services will be needed. What is important is that these 
services are generally regarded as producing good results. 
For the long term it seems likely that this capability will result in an 
Internet mail service that is logically split into two types of traffi c. 
One has substantial trust associated with its messages, so that they 
can be delivered with a reasonable degree of comfort. The other is 
the current, open-to-all service that requires heavy fi ltering and the 
use of various heuristics, to reduce the effect of abuse mail. If the fi rst 
traffi c fl ow is suffi ciently successful, fi lters for the second can become 
much more stringent. The aggregate effects of these changes will be 
that wanted mail is likely to be received and identifi ed much more 
reliably, and unwanted mail is more likely to be rejected.[8, 9]
So the current Internet mail technical infrastructure is safe, right? 
Well, maybe.
Enhancements?
What gets less attention, but perhaps should worry us more, is the 
general lack of user-level functional enhancement for e-mail. What 
users can do with e-mail, today, is pretty much the same as they 
could do 25 years ago. The evolution of Internet mail has been pri-
marily in support of performance, reliability, and scaling. Although 
important, they have not produced functional changes that are ap-
parent to end users. Human communication is a very rich space, yet 
most e-mail is limited to a narrow range of styles: person-to-person 
informal communications, and informal, unstructured group com-
munications. Toss in some very basic, one-way “transactional” mail, 
such as order confi rmations from businesses to their customers, and 
that about covers it.
Instead, new functions for human collaboration have tended to ap-
pear in new services. Instant Messaging (IM), blogging, and wikis are 
the most popular examples. In each case, they rely on a centralized 
service, rather than the highly distributed model that e-mail uses. 
Users must all go to a single, centralized address to obtain a given 
service. Most of the IM world does not even know that there are 
two (!) Internet standards for distributed IM—Extensible Messaging 
and Presence Protocol (XMPP)[6] and SIMPLE[7]. Even for these stan-
dards, most of their production use tends to be within noninteroper-
able, centralized services.
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Is there something about e-mail that is a barrier to functional 
enhancements for end users? 
For these new services, the interservice relaying that is at the core 
of e-mail is absent. Indeed, centralized services are easier to create 
and operate than are distributed services, but they also carry scaling, 
administration, and control challenges. So the issue is not so much 
what is easier, but who will do the work—and when? With a centralized 
service, all the interesting work is done by the single provider. For a 
distributed model, like e-mail, the work is shared across participating 
organizations. The Internet was designed to avoid single points of 
failure (and failure), so it is ironic that these new services risk exactly 
these problems.
For a distributed model, like e-mail, to add end-user functions, useful 
adoption is required by all user software that participates, and possibly 
by all the intermediate, relaying services. The adoption is in three 
parts: agreeing on the enhancement, modifying existing software, 
and making it available to users. These are daunting barriers, so the 
appeal of centralized services is clear: a single organization decides 
what to change, changes it, and makes it available to end users with, 
at most, a natural software upgrade. 
Interorganization partnerships provide the best argument for 
adoption of distributed services, because they do not naturally permit 
agreement on a central point of control. The counterforce is, again, 
the simplifi cation (for the partners) that comes from agreeing to use 
independent third-party services. The scaling problem here is with end 
users having to juggle a large number of independent services. Note 
the emergence of IM clients that support a variety of independent IM 
services.
Perhaps the real danger to e-mail is not its wholesale and traumatic 
replacement, stemming from frustration about abuses, but a gradual 
attrition, as portions of its traffi c move to services that evolve more 
quickly, but leave end users with a complicated array of narrow, 
specialized, and noninteroperable venues.
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Fragments
ARIN Board Advises Internet Community on Migration to IPv6
The American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) and the other 
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) have distributed Internet Protocol 
version 6, IPv6, alongside IPv4 since 1999. To date, ARIN has issued 
both protocol versions in tandem and has not advocated one over the 
other. ARIN has closely monitored trends in demand and distribution 
for both protocol versions with the understanding that the IPv4 
available resource pool would continue to diminish.
The available IPv4 resource pool has now been reduced to the 
point that ARIN is compelled to advise the Internet community 
that migration to IPv6 is necessary for any applications that require 
ongoing availability from ARIN of contiguous IP number resources. 
On 7 May 2007, the ARIN Board of Trustees passed the following 
resolution:
“Whereas, community access to Internet Protocol (IP) numbering 
resources has proved essential to the successful growth of the Internet; 
and,
 Whereas, ongoing community access to Internet Protocol version 4 
(IPv4) numbering resources can not be assured indefi nitely; and,
 Whereas, Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) numbering resources are 
available and suitable for many Internet applications,
 Be it Resolved, that this Board of Trustees hereby advises the Internet 
community that migration to IPv6 numbering resources is necessary 
for any applications which require ongoing availability from ARIN 
of contiguous IP numbering resources; and,
 Be it Ordered, that this Board of Trustees hereby directs ARIN staff to 
take any and all measures necessary to assure veracity of applications 
to ARIN for IPv4 numbering resources; and,
 Be it Resolved, that this Board of Trustees hereby requests the 
ARIN Advisory Council to consider Internet Numbering Resource 
Policy changes advisable to encourage migration to IPv6 numbering 
resources where possible.”
Implementation of this resolution will include both internal and 
external components. Internally, ARIN will review its resource re-
quest procedures and continue to provide policy experience reports 
to the Advisory Council. Externally, ARIN will send progress 
announcements to the ARIN community as well as the wider technical 
audience, government agencies, and media outlets. ARIN will produce 
new documentation, from basic introductory fact sheets to FAQs on 
how this resolution will affect users in the region. ARIN will focus 
on IPv6 in many of its general outreach activities, such as speaking 
engagements, trade shows, and technical community meetings. For 
more information, visit ARIN’s IPv6 Information Center at:
http://www.arin.net/v6/v6-info.html
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